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Act. Statutes authorizing recapitalizations generally condition the consum-
mation of these plans upon the consent of a majority or more of each class
of stockholders affected by the change. Without complete knowledge on the
part of the shareholders of the changes to be effectuated by the plan, however,
their consent is fictional. It may be that complete disclosure of many current
plans of recapitalization would make it difficult to obtain the requisite con-
sents from those stockholders to whom it was brought home that the plan
adversely affected their interests. The threat of careful scrutiny of the vital
features of recapitalization plans at the initial stages when prdxies are solicited
should have at least this one consequence: it should help force the draftsmen
of these plans to strive to evaluate fairly in the readjustment the interests of
all stockholders whose approval they are compelled by law to secure.
TERMINATION OF TRUSTS
THE SUBSTANTIALLY reduced financial condition in which many trustors
and beneficiaries have found themselves as a result of the recent depression has
led to many attempts to reach funds placed in trust. Failure to include a
power of revocation in the terms of the trust instrument has materially ham-
pered many of these attempts, and even where such a power has been reserved,
difficulties often arise in connection with the manner of its execution. It will
be the purpose of this Comment to examine the body of law which governs
the termination of trusts, with particular emphasis on the arguments and
methods employed in the endeavor to bring about a termination. Attacks on
a trust as being invalid in its creation on such grounds as fraud, undue influ-
ence, violation of the Rule against Perpetuities, or noncompliance with the
formalities of a deed or will, as well as those problems which occasionally
arise at the natural expiration of the trust term with respect to distribution
of the corpus, surchargeability of the trustee, etc., will not be treated here.
Since the doctrines controlling termination generally apply to any valid exist-
ing trust, the following discussion will treat inter vivos and testamentary
trusts indiscriminately unless otherwise specified.
A trust may be expressly revocable, expressly irrevocable, or may be silent
with respect to revocation. Since those trusts in the last group are generally
considered irrevocable,' they will be treated with expressly irrevocable trusts
in the second section of this Comment. The first section will deal with the
problems arising in the exercise of a reserved power of revocation.
TRUSTS CONTAINING A POWER OF REVOCATION
It is well established that the reservation of a power of revocation in a
trust deed does not invalidate the deed nor render it testamentary in charac-
1. 4 BoGmnT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEs (1935) § 993; RESTATEMENT, Tnusrs (1935)
§ 330.
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ter.2 The chief problems therefore concern the interpretation and exercise
of the power. An expressly revocable trust specifying no manner of revoca-
tion may be revoked in any manner which shows the clear and definite pur-
pose of the settlor to revoke.3 But it is usual to provide in the instrument
that it may be revoked by following a specified procedure, which, with minor
variants, ordinarily contemplates a written instrument, signed and acknowl-
edged by the settlor and delivered to the trustee. Where this is done, most
courts will require a strict compliance with the terms of the power.4 Thus,
where the trustor reserved a power to revoke by will, an inter vivos revoca-
tion was held to be ineffective.5 And where a revocation was to be by a writ-
ten instrument signed, sealed, witnessed, and acknowledged by the settlor and
two co-trustees, failure of the second co-trustee to join in the instrument
until after the death of the settlor rendered the attempted revocation inoper-
ative.6 The harshness of this rule has been mitigated in some jurisdictions
by requiring only substantial compliance with the prescribed manner of exer-
cising the revocation.
7
A deviation from the usual provisions concerning the method of revoca-
tion set forth above may require an interpretation of the clause to ascertain
whether any power to revoke existed, or may result in divesting the court
of power to review the attempted revocation. 8 Thus, the trust may be one to
continue for the benefit of A during his life, the trustee being empowered in
his discretion to pay the principal to A if he becomes competent to manage
property. Ordinarily the courts are reluctant to interfere with a trustee's
decision under such a provision because the trustee, in whom the trustor
may have placed special reliance, is usually in a better position to judge
2. Cramer v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 110 Conn. 22, 147 Atl. 139 (1929);
Goodrich v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Company, 270 Mich. 222, 258 N. W. 253 (1935),
(1935) 19 MINN. L REV. 821; PERRY, TRusTs AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 97;
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §§ 37, 330, Comment f.
3. Security Trust Co. v. Spruance, 20 Del. Ch. 195, 174 Atl. 285 (1934); Broga
v. Rome Trust Co., 151 Misc. 641, 272 N. Y. Supp. 101 (Sup. Ct. 1934); RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS (1935) § 330, Comment i.
4. Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, 8 At. 64 (1887); 4 BOGERT, Op. Cit. Supra
note 1, §996; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §330, Comment j; PERRY, op. cit. .mpra
note 2, §§ 104, 920 b.
5. Underhill v. U. S. Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S. W. (2d) 502 (1929).
6. Richardson v. Stephenson, 193 Wis. 89, 213 N. W. 673 (1927). Accord:
Croker v. Croker, 117 Misc. 558, 192 N. Y. Supp. 666 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
7. Hackley Union Nat. Bank v. Farmer, 252 Mich. 674, 234 N. W. 135 (1931),
(1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 1148; In re Goldowitz' Will, 145 Misc. 300, 259 N. Y. Supp.
900 (Surr. Ct. 1932)..
8. Lambdin v. Dantzebecker, 169 Md. 240, 181 At. 353 (1935); compare Bailey
v. Finlayson, 25 Fla. 153, 6 So. 157 (1889), with Allen v. Hendrick, 104 Ore. 202,
206 Pac. 733 (1922); see RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 334, Comment d; Pam,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 248.
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whether or not the condition has been fulfilled. Consequently, only gross
abuse of the trustee's discretion is reviewable.P
TRusTs CONTAINING No POWER OF REVOCATION
By far the greatest number of cases dealing with termination concern trusts
in which the settlor has failed to reserve a power of revocation. Each attempt
to terminate such a trust presents a struggle between two conflicting sets of
doctrines. On the one hand there is the broad general rule, venerable by force
of constant reiteration and honored even in the breach, that a trust, irrevoca-
ble in its creation, will be enforced until it expires by its own terms.10 On
the other hand, there are certain flatly contradictory rules, usually stated in
the form of exceptions, which are crystallizations of recurring situations in
which it has been thought that principles of equity dictated a holding con-
trary to the general rule. The general rule and some, if not all, of the excep-
tions, though irreconcilable in effect, are recognized and applied in each juris-
diction. The success of the applicant seeking a termination will therefore
hinge largely on his ability to groove the facts of the particular case within
one.of the exceptional doctrines.
It will be the purpose of this section to consider the more widely adopted
exceptions to the general rule, including termination on the theory that power
to revoke was omitted from the trust instrument by mistake, that the purpose
of the trust has been accomplished or can no longer be carried out, and on the
ground of merger, consent, and statutory provision. While these doctrines
are fairly well defined in vacuo, many cases involve more than one, and
some cases may fall in the twilight zone between two or more.
Power to Revoke Omitted by Mistake. Where no power of revocation was
actually included in the trust instrument, there may arise a presumption that
such a power was omitted 1y mistake, which, if unrebutted, will justify ter-
mination.' The operative facts necessary to create such a presumption, as
9. Colket v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 52 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. Sth, 1931);
Viall v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 45 R.- L 432, 123 At. 570 (1924), (1924)
37 HARV. L. REv. 920; REsTATE=;T, TnusTs (1935) §187; see (1924) 33 Y.zA
L. J. 668
10. Typical statements of this view are to be found in Stoehr v. Miller, 296 Fed.
414 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Boyd v. United States, 34 F. (2d) 43 (D. Conn. 1929);
Dunn v. Dunn, 219 Iowa 349, 258 N. NV. 695 (1935) ; Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co.,
195 Mass. 575, 81 N. E. 300 (1907); Anderson v. Love, 169 Miss. 219, 153 So. 369
(1934) ; Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326, 32 N. E. 1038 (1893) ; O'Brien v. Holden,
104 Vt. 338, 160 At!. 192 (1932); REsTATmE trr, TnUsrs (1935) §330, Comment b;
Pmzv, op. cit. supra note 2, § 104; 4 Boar, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1001.
11. 4 BoGErr, op. cit. supra note 1, § 993; REsTATEMENT, TnusTs (1935) § 332;
Pmy, op. cit. supra note 2, § 104. Contra: Peck v. City Trust Co., 104 Vt. 20, 156
AtL 403 (1931) ; Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575, 81 N. E. 300 (1907) ;
see Toker v. Toker, 3 deG. J. & S. 487, 491 (Ch. 1863). A trust instrument may be
reformed in equity for mistake in its execution on the same grounds as any other deed.
REsTATEmENT, TRusTs (1935) § 333. The doctrine under consideration, while probably
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well as the probative force to which it is entitled, are matters which are treated
differently in the several jurisdictions, and even within the same jurisdic-
tion.1 2 The Rhode Island courts early recognized the doctrine in its extreme
form by holding that absence of a power of revocation in a trust instrument
is prima facie evidence of mistake in not including such a power.1 3  In New
Jersey, a more moderate view has been adopted, the rule being applied to
permit termination only where the settlor seeks to revoke, and-then only to
the extent that the trust has not been acted on in good faith and if the parties
may be placed in statiu quo.14 The soundest method of treating this doctrine
finds expression in the recent Delaware case of Du Pont v. Du Pont."$ It
was there held that the absence of a power of revocation did not constitute
prima facie evidence of mistake, but that it would bar application of the parol
evidence rule, so that the court could examine the extrinsic circumstances to
discover what intent, if any, the settlor may have had with respect to revoca-
tion at the time of execution of the trust instrument, and then extend appro-
priate relief.
Purposes of Trust Accomplished. A rule commonly recognized in many
jurisdictions is that a trust will be terminated where its purpose has been
accomplished or obviated, regardless of the term fixed in the creative instru-
ment. 10 This rule is usually qualified, however, by requiring in addition that
an extension of this equitable reformation, carries the result further by requiring less
compelling evidence to justifv the presumption of mistake.
12. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 157 Md. 648. 147 Atl. 662 (1929) (S might revoke deed
of trust where power of revocation was omitted through mistake as to legal effect of
instrument) ; Price v. Price, 162 Aid. 656. 161 Atl. 2 (1932), (1933) 17 MINN. L.
Rev. 231 (circumstances strikingly similar to Atkinson v. Atkinson, and equities
seemingly more favorable for termination, yet court held. without attempting to dis-
tinguish Atkinson case, that S could not cancel parol declaration of trust regardless
of his understanding as to effect of his act at time thereof) ; Lambdiu v. Dantzebecker,
169 Md. 240. 181 Ati. 353 (1935) (absence of a power of revocation in a voluntary
trust is to be viewed with suspicion, and only very slight evidence of mistake or mis,
understanding will justify setting deed aside).
13. Aylesworth v. Whitcombe. 12 R. I. 298 (1879). This doctrine was accorded
even greater effect in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 157 Md. 648, 147 At. 662 (1929), where
the court allowed a power thus created by presumption to be exercised by strangers
to the deed.
"14. Hamilton Trust Co. v. Bamford. 102 N. J. Eq. 454, 141 Ati. 267 (Ch. 1928),
aff'd, 105 N. J. Eq. 249, 147 Atl. 909 (1929).
15. 19 Del. Ch. 131, 164 Atl. 238 (1933).
16. Cohen v. Hellman Comm. Trust & Savings Bank, 133 Cal. App, 758, 24 P.
(2d) 960 (1933) ; Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Gwynn, 206 Ky. 823, 268 S. W.
537 (1925); Eastman v. First Nat. Bank. 87 N. H. 189, 177 Atl. 414 (1935); Brooks
v. Davis, 82 N. J. Eq. 118, 88 AtI. 178 (Ch. 1913) ; In re Bechtel's Estate, 303 Pa.
107, 154 Atl. 366 (1931); Thomas v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 50 R. I. 369,
147 Atl. 884 (1929); Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115 (Rolls Ct. 1841), aff'd, Cr. &
Ph. 240 (Ch. 1841); Evans. Termination of trusts (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1070, 1084-
1090; Cleary, Indestructible Tcstamentary Trusts (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 393; KALES,
ESTATES (2d ed. 1920) §§ 732-738; 4 BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 997; 2 PERRY,
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all parties beneficially interested consent. 7 Typical holdings under the doc-
trine are that a trust to protect a gift to a wife from her drunken husband will
terminate upon her divorce ;18 that a trust to continue a specific person in the
management of a corporation will terminate on dissolution of the corpora-
tion ;'9 that a trust to protect the settlor's property while in ill health will ter-
minate on his regaining his health ;-0 and that a trust created for the sole pur-
pose of protecting the corpus for the remainderman will terminate upon a
union in one person of the equitable life estate and the legal remainder.2 '
Termination will be refused under this rule only where some definite, substan-
tial purpose, such as the protection of a spendthrift, - remains unfulfilled.P
The majority of courts, however, following a doctrine first brought into
prominence in the Massachusetts case of Claffin ", Clafin, 2 4 have refused
to sanction termination under this exception. The Clafihn doctrine, most fre-
quently applied to testamentary trusts, 2 declares that even where the benefi-
ciaries have an indefeasible interest in the entire corpus and income, if the
trust contains a provision postponing payment for a stated term, it -.,ill not
be terminated before the end of that term.20 This rule is usually explained
op. cit. supra note 2, § 920 a. The category of trusts considered under the "purpose"
rule should not be confused with the dry, or passive trust. In the latter type the trust
fails because no duties have been imposed on the trustee sufficient to prevent an exe-
cution of the trust by the Statute of Uses or its modern successor. The cases under
consideration in this section deal with attempts to terminate admittedly active trusts.
See BOGamrr, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 206-208.
17. Underhill v. United States Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S. NV. (2d) 502 (1929);
Re Thurston, 154 Mass. 596, 29 N. E. 53 (1891); Story v. Palmer, 46 N. J. Eq. 1,
18 AtI. 363 (Ch. 1889). But see Peter v. Peter, 136 Md. 157, 172, 110 At. 211, 217
(1920).
18. In re Cornils Estate. 167 Iowa 196, 149 N. NV. 65 (1914).
19. Fourth & Central Trust Co. v. Henderson Lithographing Co., 21 Ohio App.
257, 153 N. E. 125 (1926). Accord: Security National Bank v. Sternberger, 207 N. C.
811, 178 S. E. 595 (1935).
20. Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Gwynn, 206 Ky. 823, 263 S. V. 537 (1925).
21. In re Stafford's Estate, 258 Pa. 595, 102 At. 222 (1917).
22. Spendthrift provisions in the trust will provide a sufficient purpose for con-
tinuing the trust. Rose v. Southern Michigan Nat. Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 233 N. V.
284 (1931) ; In re Harrison's Estate, 322 Pa. 532, 185 Atl. 766 (1936) ; Adair v. Sharp,
49 Ohio App. 507, 197 N. E. 399 (1934) semble.
23. In Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Gwynn, 205 Ky. 823, 263 S. NV. 537
(1925), the trust instrument contained no hint as to what purpose induced the creation
of the trust, but the settlor-beneficiary was allowed to show by parol evidence bath
an inducing purpose and the accomplishment of that purpose. Contra: Anderson v.
Kemper, 116 Ky. 339, 76 S. IV. 122 (1903).
24. 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454 (1889).
25. The rule may on occasion be applied to inter rk'os trusts. Martin v. Martin,
106 N. J. Eq. 258, 150 At. 338 (Ch. 1930).
26. Shelton v. King, 229 U. S. 90 (1913); De Ladson v. Crawford, 93 Conn. 402,
106 AtL 326 (1919); Rhoads v. Rhoads, 43 Ill. 239 (1867); Young v. Snow, 167
Mass. 287, 45 N. E. 686 (1897); 2 PERRY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 622. For general
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on grounds which do not conflict directly with the proposition that a trust
may be terminated where its purposes have been accomplished; the theory
apparently is that the trustor intended the trust to continue until its natural
expiration, and that the accomplishment of this purpose in and of itself justi-
fies continuing the trust, regardless of what reasons underlay the trustor's
desire to have the trust continue.27 Illustrations are plentiful which demon-
strate that termination will be denied even though no substantial, independent
purpose remains unfulfilled.28 It has been held, for example, that the sole
life tenant who receives the legal remainder by survivorship may not obtain a
termination although the trustee had power to terminate in his discretion, on
the ground that such a result would defeat the testatrix' intention. 2 Again,
where the trust directed payment of the principal to the sole beneficiary when
he attained the age of thirty, the Claflin doctrine was applied to prevent ter-
mination before he reached thirty, even though there were no contingent
remainders, no spendthrift terms, no restriction against alienation, and the
beneficiary had in fact sold his interest, the explanation again being that the
testatrix' intention to protect the corpus had to be carried out.80 Perhaps the
most extreme example is that of a recent Maryland case where the sole benefi-
ciary had the complete equitable present interest and the complete legal re-
mainder, yet because the testator had provided that the trust was not to ter-
minate until twenty years after the beneficiary's death, the court decided in
the name of the Claffin doctrine that the beneficiary could not enjoy the prin-
cipal until then. 81
While there appears to be no noticeable trend of decisions either toward or
away from the Clafiin doctrine, there are persuasive reasons for abandoning
it in favor of the minority rule. It seems far from consistent to profess con-
cern about the trustor's intention and then to hold that a trust created to con-
comment on the Claflin doctrine, see Evans, Termination of Trusts (1928) 37 YALU
L. J. 1070, 1076-1081; Scott, Control of Property by the Dead (1917) 65 U. oF PA.
L REv. 527, 632, 647-650; Comment (1936) 34 MxcH. L. REv. 553; KALES, EsTATLs
(2d ed. 1920) §§ 732-741; GRAY, Pm'ErUTIES (3d ed. 1915) §§ 120-121 j; Cleary,
Indestructible Testamentary Trusts (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 393.
For the contrary English rule, see Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115 (Rolls Ct.
1841), aff'd, Cr. & Ph. 240 (Ch. 1841); Re Jacobs, 29 Beav. 402 (Rolls Ct. 1861);
Wharton v. Masterman [1895] A. C. 186 (H. L.).
27. Evans v. Rankin, 329 Mo. 411, 44 S. W. (2d) 644 (1931); In re Slater's
Estate, 316 Pa. 56, 173 Atl. 399 (1934); Lent v. Title & Trust Co., 137 Ore. 511,
3 P. (2d) 755 (1931) ; see RESTATEMENT, TRusTs (1935) § 337, Comment j.
28. In re Grazier's Estate, 301 Pa. 422, 152 Atl. 390 (1930); Young v. Snow,
167 Mass. 287, 45 N. E. 686 (1897); Adair v. Sharp, 49 Ohio App. 507, 197 N. E.
399 (1934); In re Hamburger's Will, 185 Wis. 270, 201 N. W. 267 (1924), (1925)
38 HA v. L. RFv. 838.
29. Evans v. Rankin, 329 Mo. 411, 44 S. W. (2d) 644 (1931). That the testatrix
was not too averse to a termination seems to follow from the provision allowing the
trustee to terminate.
30. Stier v. Nashville Trust Co., 158 Fed. 601 (C. CA. 6th, 1908).
31. Sutton v. Safe Dep. & Tiust Co., 155 Md. 483. - *.tl. 637 (19.S,.
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tinue during a term must ipso facto be preserved during that period without
further analysis of the trustor's underlying motives. Such a holding is par-
ticularly artificial because of a practical factor present in many and potentially
existant in most cases. Vested interests in almost every jurisdiction, and
contingent interests in a substantial number, are alienable.m If the benefi-
ciaries under a trust have assigned their interests, it is more than likely that
the original purposes of the trustor will thereby have been defeated.a4 In
such a situation, it is absurd to refuse termination, as has often been done,s
for fear of frustrating the trustor's intent, when the net result of the refusal
is to continue the trust for the sole benefit of the trustee. Insofar, moreover,
as the comparatively flexible minority rule allows the courts a measure of
discretion in determining the necessity or desirability of continuing the trust,
it offers a technique much better calculated to preserve a reasonable balance
between the various interests in the trust relationship than the rigid Claffin
doctrine, with its undue deference to the "dead hand."
It should be borne in mind throughout the ensuing discussion that the in-
fluence of the Claflin doctrine may be felt in some of the situations which
arise under each of the categories used in this analysis, and that the question
may then become one of determining whether the particular facts fall more
nearly within that doctrine or one of the "exceptional" rules.
Impossibility of Performance. It is a well established maxim that a trust
will be terminated, when its continued performance has become impossible or
illegal s6 Instances of illegality are rare and readily recognizable, and ter-
mination for this reason is largely a matter of course 7
Tie rule permitting termination of a trust because continuance has become
impossible admits of considerable flexibility in application, owing to the vague
idea content in the term "impossible." Termination may be allowed where
the corpus has been destroyed or is so unproductive as to render a continuance
of the trust futile.38 Most courts are reluctant to find continuation impossible,
32. PEmRY, op. cit. .upra note 2, §§ 386, 386 a.
33. GnswoLw, SPExnrHRInr TRusTs (1936) §§10, 14, 514; P=zY, op. cit. jupra
note 2, § 68; see'REsTArT EmEm, TRusis (1935) §§151-159.
34. Consider, for example, the case of a trust to preserve the corpus for the
remainderman.
35. Stier v. Nashville Trust Co., 158 Fed. 601 (C. C.A. 6th, 1903) ; In re Grazier's
Estate, 301 Pa. 422, 152 AtL 390 (1930); In re Hamburger's Will, 185 Wis. 270, 201
N. W. 267 (1924). The court's position might be rationalized as an attempt to penalize
the assignee of such interests on the assumption that most of them have driven hard
bargains.
36. 4 Bo=as', op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 997, 999; RSTATEuIm, Tnusrs (1935)
§ 335; 2 Pmy, op. cit. supra note 2, § 920a.
37. REsTATEm N, TRusTs (1935) § 335, Comment d; Pmny, op. cit. suPra note 2,
§99.
38. Black v. Bailey, 142 Ark., 201, 218 S. NV. 210 (1920); Thorne v. Thorne,
L2- Md. 119, 93 At. 406 (1915); Donaldson v. Allen, 182 Mo. 626, 81 S. W. 1151
(1904); Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Lester, 239 App. Div. 422, 267 N. Y. Supp. 827 (2d
Dee't 1933); 4 Bocrr, op. cit. jupra note 1, § 999; see Trust Co. of N. J. v. Glunz,
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however, where there is any hope of restoring the corpus.30 Thus, a termina-
tion urged on this ground has been refused although the corpus was at the
time of the action so depleted as to be incapable of producing sufficient income
to pay its own cost of maintenance.
40
Many attempts have been made to expand the coverage of the term "impos-
sibility" to include cases where a continuance of the trust will result in great
hardship to the beneficiaries of the postponed interests. 41 Such'attempts for
the most part have been fruitless.42 Likewise, the courts are extremely re-
luctant to break into the trust scheme merely because the beneficiaries are
otherwise unable to support themselves, but proof that a minor's necessities of
life are at stake will aid in extending the scope of "impossibility" to permit
a termination,4 3 as will a provision in the trust instrument permitting an ad-
vancement of principal on certain conditions.
44
A theory closely related to impossibility was recently promulgated in
Reuther v'. Fidelit v Union Trust Co.45 The donor had placed nearly all his
savings into an insurance trust, not expressly irrevocable, and by whose terms
his wife and children, some of them minors, took vested interests. There-
after the settlor became destitute, and he, together with all the beneficiaries
of age, consented to and sought a termination of the trust. The court, appar-
ently impressed with the immediate needs of the beneficiaries, found that the
donor had been persuaded to create the trust when economic prospects were
bright, that he had not realized how permanent an institution a trust is,
that the execution thereof had proved to be "unwise and improvident" with
respect to the interests of the donor's minor children, and for those rea-
sons decreed a termination. By utilizing hindsight to classify the creation
of the trust as improvident, and recognizing such improvidence as a basis
for subsequent termination, the Reuther case, if generally followed, will pro-
vide a broad foundation for attacking any irrevocable trust.
Merger. Where the equitable interest of the beneficiary and the legal inter-
est of the trustee are acquired by the same person, a merger is said to occur,
the effect of which is to terminate the trust.46 The rather unsatisfactory ex-
119 N. J. Eq. 73, 181 Atl. 27 (Ch. 1935); Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326, 328,
32 N. E. 1088, 1089 (1893).
39. See note 36, stpra.
40. Re Estate of Stack, 214 Wis. 98. 251 N. W. 470 (1933); s.c., 217 Wis. 94,
258 N. W. 324 (1935); Stout v. Stout, 192 Ky. 504, 233 S. W. 1057 (1921) semble;
see Comment (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1000.
41. See Haldeman's Trustee v. Haldeman. 239 Ky. 717, 40 S. W. (2d) 348 (1931).
42. Price v. Price, 162 Md. 656, 161 Atl. 2 (1932); Lent v. Title & Trust Co.,
137 Ore. 511, 3 P. (2d) 755 (1931) ; Stewart v. Hamilton, 151 Tenn. 396, 270 S. W.
79 (1925).
43. Post v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 255 Mich. 436, 238 N. W. 206 (1931).
44. Hedges v. Hopper, 118 N. J. Eq. 359, 179 Atl. 261 (Ch. 1935).
45. 116 N. J. Eq. 81, 172 Atl. 386 (1934), (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 176.
46. In re Selous, 11901] 1 Ch. 921: Newman v. Newman, 28 Ch. D. 674 (1ES);
Parker v. Converse, 5 Gray 336 (Mass. 1855) ; Evans, Tcrmination of Trusts (1 t),
37 YALE L. J. 1070, 1077-1079, 1094; 4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 1, §998; PRRY,
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planation usually advanced in the cases is that a person cannot be trustee for
himself of an estate co-extensive with his legal estate.47 Probably the real
reason is the futility of regarding a person as a fiduciary when his only duties
in that capacity would be owed to himself.
According to strictly technical notions, merger results only if there is a
complete coalescence of the interests. 48 Consequently, a merger is not recog-
nized when one of several cestuis becomes a trustee,40 or the cestui becomes
one of several trustees.60 But occasionally the courts will find that a merger
has occurred merely because the equitable life estate and the legal remainder
are united in one person or group of persons.5 ' This unorthodox result has
been reached on the basis of quite vague reasoning and frequently involves
considerable doctrinal confusion. The facts of the cases often suggest that
they would normally fall within the category dealt with in the preceding sec-
tion, concerning accomplishment of purpose;52 it is therefore not altogether
surprising to find that although a technical merger has been held to justify
termination whether or not the trustor's purposes have been accomplished,53
in the line of cases in question, the courts supplement their discussion of
merger with a consideration of whether any substantial purpose of the trust
remains unfulfilled,54 one court going so far as to infuse the principles of
merger into a discussion of the Clafflin doctrine. 5
op. cit. stpra note 2, §§347, 348, 920c; REsTATEmNT, TRUSTS (1935) §§341-343; cf.
Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, 98 N. E. 1054 (1912).
47. In re Selous, [1901] 1 Ch. 921, 922; PERRY, op. cit. supra note 2, §347.
48. See note 46, supra.
49. Burbach v. Burbach, 217 Ill. 547, 75 N. E. 519 (1905) ; Gould v. Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Co., 53 R. I. 422, 167 Atl. 119 (1933).
50. Story v. Palmer, 46 N. J. Eq. 1, 18 At. 363 (Ch. 1889).
51. White v. Weed, 87 N. H. 153, 175 At. 814 (1934); Brooks v. Davis, 82 N. 3.
Eq. 118, 88 At. 178 (1913) ; fi re Stafford's Estate, 258 Pa. 595, 102 At. 222 (1917);
In re Fitton's Will, 218 Wis. 63, 259 N. NV. 718 (1935).
52. It has been suggested that the cases are explainable on the ground that the
only purpose of the particular trusts involved was to preserve the remainder or protect
the life tenant [see, e.g., In re Mowinkel's Estate, 130 Neb. 10, 263 N. AV. 483 (1935);
Equitable Trust Co. v. Snader, 17 Del. Ch. 303, 154 AtL. 15 (Ch. 1931)], and that the
purpose could no longer be accomplished. See Evans, Termination of Trusts (1928)
37 YALE L. J. 1070, 1079.
53. Evans, Termination of Trusts (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1070, 1093. Even Spend-
thrift provisions in the trust will not prevent a termination unless the beneficiaries
request a continuance. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §341, Comment c.
54. Bowlin v. Citizen's Bank and Trust Co., 131 Ark. 97, 198 S. IV. 283 (1917)
(spendthrift provisions a sufficient purpose to prevent merger); Equitable Trust Co. v.
Snader, 17 Del. CI. 203, 151 At. 712 (Ch. 1930), s.c., 17 Del. Ch. 308, 154 At. 15
(Ch. 1931) (termination allowed where no purpose extant); In re Afowinlrel's Estate,
130 Neb. 10, 263 N. WV. 488 (1935) (termination would violate testator's intent) ; In re
Fitton's Will, 218 Vis. 63, 259 N. NV. 718 (1935) (idem). Technically speaking, the
question of merger should have been dismissed in all these cases for lack of coalescence
in the interests united.
55. Re Vill of Hamburger, 185 XVis. 270, 201 N. NV. 267 (1924); Sutton v.
Safe Dep. & Trust Co., 155 Md. 483, 142 At!. 627 (1928) scmble.
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This unorthodox type of merger offers a beneficiary a ready escape from
the burdensome restrictions of the trust, since he can assign the present benefi-
cial interest to the legal remainderman 6 or take an assignment of the latter's
interest.57 The former course is not open, however, in those jurisdictions
which prohibit the alienation of equitable interests ;68 and the utility of the
device is further limited in that the presence of spendthrift provisions in the
trust instrument will usually prevent this form of merger.59
Consent. One of the most widely adopted exceptions to the general rule
is that where all the parties beneficially interested in trust property are in
existence and sui juris, they may together put an end to the trust, in whole
or in part. 60 A limitation commonly imposed on this exception, however, is
that spendthrift provisions in the trust instrument will prevent termination
by consent."' Furthermore, some jurisdictions have added the requirement
that all the settlor's purposes must have been fulfilled. 2 Aside from the spend-
thrift cases, it seems questionable to insist on a fulfillment of trust purpose.
This factor should certainly be given scant attention in the case of an inter
tivos trust where the settlor has consented and is seeking a termination, for
56. Re Stafford's Estate, 258 Pa. 595, 102 AtI. 222 (1917).
57. Thorn v. Thorn, 95 Va. 413, 28 S. E. 583 (1897); cf. Brooks v. Davis, 82
N. J. Eq. 118, 88 At. 178 (1913) (life tenants and remaindermen conveyed to stranger).
58. Matter of Wentworth, 230 N. Y. 176, 129 N. E. 646 (1920); In re Hull's
Estate, 141 Misc. 288, 251 N. Y. Supp. 683 (Surr. Ct. 1931) ; N. Y. PEas. PaoP. LAW
§ 15; N. Y. REAL PRoP. LAW § 103.
59. Bowlin v. Citizen's Bank and Trust Co., 131 Ark. 97, 198 S. W. 288 (1917).
60. Welch v. Episcopal Theological School, 189 Mass. 108, 75 N. E. 139 (1905);
Fredericks v. Near, 260 Mich. 627, 245 N. W. 537 (1932) ; Spooner v. Dunlap, 87 N. H.
384, 180 Aft. 256 (1935);, In re Bechtel's Estate, 303 Pa. 107, 154 At!. 366 (1931);
Rowley v. American Trust Co., 144 Va. 375, 132 S. E. 347 (1926); O'Brien v. Holden,
104 Vt. 338, 160 At. 192 (1932); 4 BoaT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1002; 2 PEmR,
op. ci. supra note 2, §§ 920-920 d; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §§ 337-340.
The objection of one of several beneficiaries will prevent a termination. Diller
v. Kilgore, 135 Kan. 200, 9 P. (2d) 643 (1932); Skillin v. Skillin, 133 Me. 347, 177
Atl. 706 (1935) semble. If one of the beneficiaries is a minor, or under some other
incapacity, he cannot consent, and no termination can be effected. RESTATEMEi4T,
TRUSTS (1935) § 340, Comment c. But see Byers v. Beddow, 106 Fla. 166, 172, 142
So. 894, 896 (1932).
61. Maher v. Maher, 207 Ky. 360, 269 S. W. 287 (1924); Rose v. Southern
Mich. Nat. Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 238 N. W. 284 (1931); 4 BOGERT, Op. Cit. .Supra
note 1, §1002; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §337, Comment I. The Restatement
indicates that in the spendthrift cases a distinction is to be drawn between the cases
where the settlor consents to a termination and those where he does not. Compare
§337, Comment 1, with §338, Comment d; cf. King v. York Trust Co., 278 Pa. 141,
122 At. 227 (1923) (indicating that if the consents of all parties beneficially interested
had been obtained, termination would have been allowed at settlor's request).
62. Smith v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 Fla. 390, 156 So. 498 (1934); Eastman
v. First Nat. Bank, 87 N. H. 189, 177 Atl. 414 (1935); In re Bechtel's Estate, 303 Pa.
107, 154 Atl. 366 (1931); In re Stafford's Estate, 258 Pa. 595, 102 Atl. 222 (1917);
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 337; 2 PERRY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 920.
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it follows from his consent that his original purpose has been accomplished
or is no longer material. And even a testamentary trust should be terminable
simply by consent unless the purpose which would be fulfilled by its continu-
ance is of a substantial nature, something more than the empty purpose of
preserving the trust term so anxiously guarded under the Claflin doctrine.
It would be expected, as a part of the consent doctrine, that a sole benefi-
ciary could terminate the trust upon his own application. Where the sole
beneficiary is also the settlor of the trust, it is usually held that he may ter-
minate at will.6 But if the trust is testamentary, the sole beneficiary may be
refused a termination on the ground that the testator's intention would thereby
be defeated.3 4 This distinction raises an inference that the consent of the
creator may be necessary, to settle doubts as to his purpose, even in the case
of an inter zivos trust, although he has retained no beneficial interesPz The
power of the sole beneficiary to terminate was further limited in Rehr v. Fi-
delity-Philadelphia Trust Co. cc It was there held that even though the sole
beneficiary was also the settlor, the fact that he had included spendthrift pro-
visions in the trust deprived him of his power to obtain a termination. H6w-
ever orthodox this result may be where the settlor is not the sole benefidary,
it seems futile in this instance; for, since transferees and creditors can gener-
ally reach the corpus of a spendthrift trust created by the settlor for his own
benefit,W the settlor can avoid the effect of the Rehr case by assigning or bor-
rowing on his interest in the trust.
Thus far it has been assumed that all the requisite parties had consented
and were before the court. But in many cases preliminary problems arise
as to what parties must consent to a termination, and how their consent may
be obtained. As a broad proposition, it is usually stated that the consent of
all persons "beneficially interested" must be procured9ca A trustee is not
63. Long v. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 103 Pa. Sup-. 363, 165 At.
56 (1933) ; O'Brien v. Holden, 104 Vt. 338, 160 At. 192 (1932) ; R sTmrm , Tnu s
(1935) §339. Contra: Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575, 81 N. E. ZO)
(1907); Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Gwynn, 206 Ky. 823, 263 S. AV. 537 (1925).
64. The Massachusetts cases are typical of the confusion instilledoin this situation
by the Claflin doctrine. Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395, 15 N. E. 795 (1M) (cole
beneficiary of testamentary trust providing for annuity to be paid him for life allowed
termination); Claffin v. Clailn, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454 (18S9) (sole b=eficiary
refused termination where payments of principal were postponed to stated intervals);
cf. Young v. Snow, 167 Mass. 287, 45 N. E. 686 (1897); Welch v. Trustees of Eis-
copal Theological School, 189 Mass. 108, 75 N. E. 139 (1905).
65. No cases have been found determining this precise point. Compare RrsrA=-
sNTr, TRusTS (1935) § 337 with id. § 338, especially Comment a.
66. 310 Pa. 301, 165 At. 380 (1933), (1933) 43 YAL L. J. 342. Contra: lmT=r-
mEN, TRusTs (1935) § 338, Comment d.
67. GasswoLn, op. cit. supra note 33, §§474, 497; Griswold, Spendthrift Trts
Created in Whole or in Part for the Benefit of the Settlor (1930) 44 HAnv. L f-L.
203; REsTAT SUEN, TRusTs (1935) 156; 2 Pmmy, op. cit. 4upra note 2, § 815c; Evans,
Termination of Trusts (1928) 37 YAE. L J. 1070, 1071.
68. Hurt v. Gilmer, 40 F. (2d) 794 (App. D. C. 1930); Rayhol Co. v. Holland,
110 Conn. 516, 148 AtL 358 (19S'0); Underhill v. U. S. Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13
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beneficially interested within the meaning of this rule.60 On the other hand,
all persons presently entitled to the income or use of the trust property are
of course beneficially interested. The chief difficulty is to determine the status
of the persons to whom a future interest is given by the terms of the trust.
If the court can be persuaded that the particular future interest involved
is a reversion rather than a remainder, the consent of the persons presump-
tively entitled to take need not be obtained. The theoiy is that a reversionary
interest passes by descent rather than by purchase through the trust instru-
ment,70 and that since the grantor retains complete control over transfer by
descent,71 those presumptively entitled to the reversionary interest are not
beneficially interested, at least for the purposes of the consent doctrine.72
The future interests are clearly reversionary within the meaning of this rule
if, after the expiration of the particular estate, no disposition is made of the
corpus, or it is limited to the settlor's estate or his personal representatives. 78
But if the terms of the trust instrument are interpreted as creating a re-
mainder, the remaindermen take by purchase through the trust instrument, a
fact which is thought to compel the conclusion that however contingent the
remaindermen's interest, the trust may not be terminated under the consent
doctrine without their acquiescence. 74 And this is true although the likelihood
of a particular class of contingent remaindermen ever taking an actual inter-
est is beyond the scope of reasonable probability.75 Nor are remaindermen
any the less "beneficially interested" for the purposes of the consent doctrine
because they are unborn at the time of the adjudication.70 Thus, a limitation
over to "the children of A" creates an interest in an indeterminate class, sub-
S. W. (2d) 502 (1929); Skillin v. Skillin, 133 Me. 347, 177 Atl. 706 (1935); RESTATE-
MENT, TRUSTS (1935) §340(1).
69. RESTATEmENT, TRusTs (1935) §337, Comment b.
70. Biwer v. Martin, 294 Ill. 488, 128 N. E. 518 (1920); Doctor v. Hughes, 225
N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919); 2 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 1902) § 1510
et seq.; 24 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (1912) § 402; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
(2d ed. 1920) § 130.
71. See note 68, supra; PERRY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 188; TIFFANY, op. Cit. supra
note 70, § 131.
72. Newlin v. Girard Trust Co., 116 N. J. Eq. 498, 174 At. 479 (Ch. 1934);
In re Taylor's Estate, 114 N. J. Eq. 620, 168 Ati. 789 (Prerog. Ct. 1933).
73. See DuPont v. DuPont, 19 Del. Ch. 131, 139, 142, 164 Atl. 238, 241, 242 (Ch.
1932); Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 312, 122 N. E. 221, 222 (1919); Pomroy
v. Hincks, 180 N. Y. 73, 72 N. E. 628 (1904).
- 74. Hurt v. Gilmer, 40 F. (2d) 794 (App. D. C. 1930) ; Underhill v. U. S. Trust
Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S. V. (2d) 502 (1929); King v. York Trust Co., 278 Pa. 141,
122 AtI. 227 (1923) ; 2 WASHBURN, op. cit. supra note 70, § 1526 et seq.
75. See DuPont v. DuPont, 18 Del. Ch. 316, 317, 159 Atl. 841, 842 (Ch. 1932);
cf. Evans, Termination of Trusts (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1070, 1071, 1090.
76. Underhill v. U. S. Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S. W. (2d) 502 (1929); see
DuPont v. DuPont, 18 Del. Ch. 316, 317, 159 Atl. 841, 842 (Ch. 1932); TIFFANY,
op. cit. supra note 70, § 136; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 340, Comment d.
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ject to be opened up by the birth of another child before A's death or the ex-
piration of the trust, and the interest of the unborn children cannot be cut off
without their consent.77 The effect of this doctrine is the more sweeping
because of the irrebuttable presumption indulged in by the American courts
that every person, male or female, of every age, status, or condition of health,
is capable of having issue.78 Finally, it should be noted that a remainderman's
consent must generally be obtained although his interest is subject to being
cut off by the exercise of a power of appointment. Hence a trust "with re-
mainder to such persons as A shall appoint by will, and in default of appoint-
ment, to B," cannot be terminated without B's consent, even though A has
already executed a will appointing a third party, and A and the third party
have consented."9 This is explained on the ground that A's vll might be re-
voked before death. In this situation, however, the supposed reason for the
distinction between reversions and remainders is no longer applicable. It is
said that those presumptively entitled to a reversion need not consent to a
termination because of the settlor's control over the transfer of the property
at his death; yet in the situation in question, A's control over the transfei of
the property at his death is equally great, and the similarity is merely more
noticeable if A also happens to be settlor. The purely verbal difference that B
is considered as taking by purchase hardly justifies the application of a dif-
ferent rule.
As a result of the requirement that unascertainable remaindermen consent
to a termination, together with the widely accepted rule that minors are in-
capable of giving their consent, 0 the consent doctrine has become virtually un-
available in a substantial number of cases as a technique for obtaining ter-
mination. To overcome these difficulties, two arguments have been made
which seem to deserve more consideration than they have yet received. Occa-
sionally it has been contended that the only persons beneficially interested are
those who would take an interest if the trust were to terminate at the time of
77. A contrary result would be readhed if the limitation 'were to named children
of A or to those children in being at creation of the trust Tn 1F'Y, op. cit. supra
note 70, § 137.
78. DuPont v. DuPont, 18 Del. Ch. 316, 159 AUt. 841 (Ch. 1932) ; Byers v. Beddo,
106 Fla. 166, 142 So. 894 (1932); Brown v. Owsley, 193 Ky. 344, 248 S. VI. EW
(1923) ; 4 BoGoRT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1002; Evans, Term iration of Trusts (1928)
37 YAsx L. J. 1070, 1091. Contra: White v. 'Weed, 87 N. I. 153, 175 AtL 814 (1934).
The rule has been supported on the ground that a contrary result would violate
public policy by fostering perjury and illegal operations. Byers v. Beddovz, 105 Fla.
166, 142 So. 894 (1932).
The English courts have long allowed proof that possibility of issue is extinct in
a particular person for this purpose. Re White, [1901] 1 Ch. 570; (1930) 67 A.LR. 549.
79. DuPont v. DuPont, 18 Del. Ch. 316, 159 At. 841 (Ch. 1932); Underhil v.
U. S. Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S. NV. (2d) 502 (1929); Court v. Banlers Trust
Co., 160 N. Y. Supp. 477 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Evans, Termination of Trusts (1928) 37
YA.E L. J. 1070, 1071; cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Harris, 267 N. Y. 1, 195 N. E. M
(1935).
80. Vhittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
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the adjudication. This argument disregards precedent and historical back-
ground and, wherever accepted, amounts to the adoption of a new property
concept, to the effect that no interest vests by purchase in unborn or unascer-
tainable remaindermen. It apparently has not been allowed in those jurisdic-
tions having no statutory method of revocation and will, therefore, be treated
more fully hereafter.8 1
A possible escape lies in a more extensive recognition of the doctrine of
representation. Advantage may be taken of this principle in one of three
ways. The trustee may be allowed to represent all interests under the trust ;82
the presently existing, sui juris members in a given class of remaindermen
may be allowed to represent all future members of this class with whom they
have an identity of interest ;83 or a guardian ad litem may be appointed for
those remaindermen not sui juris or in a wholly unascertainable class.8 4 The
usefulness of a representative thus far has been limited to actions for ter-
mination on grounds other than consent 5 in which the principal purpose of
his appearance is to prevent subsequently ascertained interests from attack-
ing the decree. It is unlikely that in the absence of a statute"6 the consent of
a representative would justify termination solely on the basis of the consent
doctrine. While this device of representation seems on its face to be rather
artificial, it is hardly more so than the accepted doctrine which allows an un-
born person to take an interest by purchase under a trust instrument.
Termination According to Statute. A few jurisdictions have enacted stat-
utes facilitating the termination of trusts where no provision has been made
therefor in the instrument.87 As there has been comparatively little litigation
resulting from such legislation outside New York, this discussion will be con-
fined to the statute and cases of that state.
In order to abrogate the former New York rule that a trust could not be
terminated by consent,88 Section 23 of the Personal Property Law was enact-
81. See page 1021, infra. This method seems to be permitted by statute in North
Carolina. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 996; Stanbach, v. Citizens Nat. Bank,
197 N. C. 292, 148 S. E. 313 (1929), (1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 92.
82. Scott v. Scott, 307 Ill. 586, 139 N. E. 70 (1923).
83. Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931).
84. DuPont v. DuPont, 18 Del. Ch. 316, 159 Ati. 841 (Ch. 1932); see McKnight
v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 254 N. Y. 417, 421, 173 N. E. 568, 570 (1930);
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) § 182.
85. E. g., for improvidence, as in the Reuther case, jupra. See DuPont v. DuPont,
18 Del. Ch. 316, 319, 159 Atl. 841, 842 (Ch. 1932); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936)
99 182-186.
86. Statutory provisions have been construed to give the guardian the power to
consent to a termination in Kentucky. Riedlin's Guardian v. Cobb, 222 Ky. 654,
1 S. W. (2d) 1071 (1928), (1930) 18 Ky. L. J. 400.
87. In California, voluntary trusts are revocable unless expressly declared irre-
vocable. CAL- CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 2280. A voluntary trust may be revoked
in North Carolina without regard to the interests of unborn remaindermen. N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §996.
88. The result was based on the view in New York that a beneficiary's interest
is inalienable. Hoskin v. Long Island Loan & Trust Co., 139 App. Div. 258, 123 N. Y.
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ed, providing that: "Upon the written consent of all the persons beneficially
interested in a trust in personal property or any part thereof heretofore or
hereafter created, the creator of such trust may revoke the same as to the
whole or such part thereof, and thereupon the estate of the trustee shall cease
in the whole or such part thereof."89
As might have been anticipated from the experience at common law, the
chief problem raised by this Section is to determine who is "beneficially in-
terested" within the meaning of the statute. In the statement of general rules,
fhe courts are completely in accord, and reiterate the same principles that
appear in the cases where a termination is sought by consent in the absence
of a statute.9 0 If the corpus is disposed of as a remainder, the remaindermen
take an interest by purchase, are "beneficially interested," and must consent
to a termination ;91 if the right to the corpus remains in the settlor as a rever-
sion, the only consents necessary are those of the settlor and the beneficiaries
of the particular estates.9 2 But while there is substantial agreement as to
these general propositions, the case law on more specific issues htus
become extremely confused, especially as between the several appellate divi-
sions.Y3
Supp. 994 (2d Dep't 1910) ; Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326, 32 N. E. 1033 (1893);
see Untermyer, J., dissenting in Kuntze v. Guaranty Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 871,
872, 290 N. Y. Supp. 812, 813 (1st Dep't 1936).
89. By an amendment added in 1932, trusts of real property may be revol'ed in
substantially the same manner, the major difference being the requirement of a greater
degree of formality in the revoking instrument. N. Y. PxAL Prop. L.w § 118. Before
1932 there was a noticeable tendency to assimilate the treatment of trusts of peman-
alty and realty. Cruger v. Union Trust Co., 173 App. Div. 797, 160 N. Y. Supp.
480 (1st Dep't 1916); see National Park Bank v. Billings, 144 App. Div. 536, 541,
129 N. Y. Supp. 846, 850 (1st Dep't 1911), aff'd, 203 N. Y. 556, 95 N. E. 1122 (1911) ;
Davies v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 30, 382, 223 N. Y. Supp.
398, 400 (1st Dep't 1936).
90. See, for example, statements in Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co.,
235 App. Div. 170, 256 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 260 N. Y. 539, 184
N. E. 83 (1932); Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co., 267 N. Y. 358, 195 N. F_. 23
(1935) ; Beam v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 182, 293 N. Y.
Supp. 403 (1st Dep't 1936); Corbett v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 229 App. Div.
570, 242 N. Y. Supp. 638 (1st Dep't 1930).
91. McKnight v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 254 N. Y. 417, 173 N. F. 563
(1930), (1931) 5 ST. JoHi's L. REv. 283; Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co., 267 N. Y.
358, 196 N. E. 288 (1935); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Harris, 267 N. Y. 1, 195 N. F.
529 (1935).
92. Franklin v. Chatham Phenix Nat. Bank, 234 App. Div. 369, 255 N. Y. Supp.
115 (1st Dep't 1932); Abraham v. Abraham, 245 App. Div. 302, 280 N. Y. Supp. 825
(1st Dep't 1935); Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 235 App. Div. 170,
256 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1st Dep't 1932) aff'd, 260 N. Y. 539, 184 N. B. 83 (1932),
(1933) 17 MNN. L. REv. 346; see Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co., 267 N. Y. 353,
363, 196 N. F. 288, 290 (1935); Beam v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 248
App. Div. 182, 186, 288 N. Y. Supp. 403, 407 (1st Dep't 1936) (concurring opion).
93. Compare Davies v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 320, 283
N. Y. Supp. 398 (1st Dep't 1936) with Beam v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
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One of the most troublesome questions is that of construing the words of
limitation involved in the particular trust instrument under consideration in
order to determine whether they create a reversion or a remainder. In the
famous case of Doctor v. Hughes,9 4 a trust was created to pay the income to
the grantor for life and on his death to convey the corpus to the grantor's heirs
at law. By applying the doctrine of worthier title, it was held that the grantor
had retained a reversion which the heirs took by descent and had not invested
them with a remainder by purchase. The court stated that "to transform into
a remainder what would ordinarily be a reversion, the intention to work the
transformation must be clearly expressed,"95 and that no such intention had
been made evident.
The problem was considerably complicated in 1929 by the case of Whitte-
more v. Equitable Trust Co. of N. Y.91 There a trust was created to pay the
income to C for life and then to H. On the death of C and H, the property
was to be returned to the settlors. But if one of the latter died before the
termination of the particular estates, then his interest was to go to such per-
sons as he appointed by will; or in default of such appointment to such per-
sons and in such shares as "would have been distributable if such deceased
Settlor had been the owner thereof at the time of his or her death and had
died intestate." All the adult parties interested consented to a termination
of the trust, but two of the three settlors had minor children living who were
incapable of consenting. The court again declared that in determining whether
the settlor's children were remaindermen or were merely presumptively en-
titled to a reversionary interest, it wQuld look to the settlor's intention as
expressed in the instrument.9 7 But since the words used in the "rather full and
formal disposition of the principal" indicated an "intention to give a re-
mainder to the spouse and children," it was found that there was a remainder
despite the fact that the words of the dispositive clause did no more than spell
out the process by which an absolute owner of property may dispose of it.,8
248 App. Div. 182, 288 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dep't 1936) (decided same day by same
court).
94. 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919).
95. 225 N. Y. 305, 312, 122 N. E. 221, 222 (1919); cf. Hussey v. City Bank
Farmers' Trust Co., 236 App. Div. 117, 258 N. Y. Supp. 396 (1st Dep't 1932).
96. 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929), (1930) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 543. Many
of the cases before this decision are collected in an article: Revocation of Trusts of
Personal Property (1929) 7 N. Y. L. REv. 42; see (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 913; 4
BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 995; cf. Aranyi v. Bankers Trust Co., 201 App. Div.
706, 194 N. Y. Supp. 614 (1st Dep't 1922).
97. 250 N. Y. 298, 303, 165 N. E. 454, 456 (1929); cf. Beam v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 182, 288 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dep't 1936) (income
to grantor for life and principal as he appoints, by will; and in default of appointment,
to the "heirs at law of the grantor." Held that the grantor made so "full and formal
a disposition" as to create a remainder in his heirs.)
98. Cf. Davies v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 380, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 398 (1st Dep't 1936). The court declared that if, in place of the detailed pro-
visions for disposition of the property in the event of a settlor dying before termination
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In many of the subsequent cases arising under Section 23, the decision, or the
ground for the dissent, has been based on a comparison made between the
qualitative content of the dispositive clause in the case at b'ar and that in the
Whittemore trust.09 But several of the decisions have held that the latter
case can be a precedent for nothing more than the rule that the settlor's inten-
tion is to govern in the construction of any trust document and that therefore
each case must be confined to its individual facts. 00 The result -of this view,.
as becomes apparent from an examination of the many subsequent cases, is to
make the outcome of a particular case uncertain until the highest court has
determined the settlor's intent.
A second problem has arisen as to whether the courts will follow the com-
mon law rule that the consent of all remaindermen must be obtained, no matter
how contingent their interests. Some of the appellate division decisions have
recognized the doctrine that the only persons "beneficially interested" in the
trust within the meaning of Section 23 are those who would be entitled to the
property if the particular estate should fall in at the time the action is
brought.101 The Court of Appeals has not expressly sanctioned this doctrine,
but has impliedly approved it.'02 This result seems both plausible and desir-
able. While it may be contended that Section 23 is merely an enactment of the
common law rule existing in other states, 0 3 it may be argued with equal force
that the legislature intended to provide an effective method of terminating an
otherwise irrevocable trust, an intent which would to a large extent be defeat-
ed if the requirement is imposed that unascertainable or unborn remainder-
of the particular estate, the principal had been directed to be paid over to the "settlor
or his next of kin," these words would in all probability not have created a remainder.
250 N. Y. 298, 303, 165 N. E. 454, 456 (1929); cf. Franklin v. Chatham Phenix Nat.
Bank, 234 App. Div. 369, 255 N. Y. Supp. 115 (lst Dep't 1932).
99. Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co., 267 N. Y. 358, 196 N. E. 283 (1935) ; Beam
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 182, 283 N. Y. Supp. 403 (Ist
Dep't 1936); see Davies v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 3S0, 383,
288 N. Y. Supp. 378, 401 (1st Dep't 1936) (dissenting opinion). Cf. Abraham v.
Abraham, 245 App. Div. 302, 280 N. Y. Supp. 825 (1st Dep't 1935).
100. Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 260 N. Y. 539, 184 N. F-. 83 (1932);
Davies v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 3S0, 283 N. Y. Supp. 393
(1st Dep't 1936).
101. Thatcher v. Empire Trust Co., 243 App. Div. 430, 277 N. Y." Supp. 874 (1st
Dep't 1935); Corbett v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 229 App. Div. 570, 242 N. Y.
Supp. 638 (1st Dep't 1930), (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 913; Beam v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 182, 288 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dep't 1936); Mayer
v. Chase Nat. Bank, 143 Misc. 714, 257 N. Y. Supp. 161 (1932), aff'd, 236 App. Div.
778, 258 N. Y. Supp. 1046 (1st Dep't 1932); O'Leary v. Grant, 155 Misc. 93, 273
N. Y. Supp. 839 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
10. McKnight v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 254 N. Y. 417, 173 N. E. 5-63
(1930); see Beam v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 182, 185,
288 N. Y. Supp. 403, 406 (1st Dep't 1936).
103. See page 1014, supra; Beam v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 243 App.
Div. 182, 185, 288 N. Y. Supp. 403, 406 (1st Dep't 1936).
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men must consent to a termination. The objection may be made that such
an interpretation results in destroying interests which, when they vest, will
have vested by purchase and therefore, according to well established legal
doctrines,1°4 cannot be divested without the beneficiary's consent. But the
courts have no scruples about divesting a vested remainder without the con-
sent of the remainderman where the settlor has reserved a power of revoca-
tion. If Section 23 be considered as a statutory power of revocation which is
impliedly incorporated in every trust instrument, there should be no objection
to divesting the interests of unascertainable remaindermen by an exercise of
that power.
But pending a more definite recognition of this principle by the Court of
Appeals, the possibility of terminating a trust involving presently unascer-
tainable remaindermen is exceedingly dubious. °0 Also it is clear under the
Whittemore case that the existence of minors beneficially interested in the
trust will bar any attempt to terminate. 10 6 Nevertheless, there remains one
method of obtaining a revocation under Section 23 in certain instances despite
these obstacles. In the recent case of Meyer v. Bank of Manhattan,t °T a trust
was created, irrevocable by its terins, under which certain persons were benefi-
cially interested who refused to consent to a termination. However, the set-
tlor had reserved the power to alter or modify the terms of the trust so far
as they affected distributions of principal and income by changing proportions
or substituting beneficiaries. The settlor exercised his power by providing that
the entire net income should be paid to his wife for life, and on her death
the trust should terminate and the principal be paid over to himself. The
settlor and his wife thereafter delivered to the trustee properly executed con-
sents to termination which the court held to be effective, since the settlor and
his wife had become the only persons beneficially interested.
The Court of Appeals has not as yet passed on the precise issue involved, 10 8
but there has been adverse criticism of this device.1°0 While there is no ques-
tion that after the exercise of the power of alteration the trust fell within the
purview of Section 23, the objection seems to be that the power was not exer-
104. See notes 68, 74, supra.
105. Little use seems to have been made of the doctrine of representation. Some
indication has been given that it might succeed in a proper case. See McKnight v.
Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 254 N. Y. 417, 421, 173 N. E. 568, 570 (1930); O'Leary
v. Grant, 155 Misc. 98, 100, 278 N. Y. Supp. 839, 841 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
106. The Whittemore case has been limited to apply only to minors as contrasted
with unborn remaindermen. Beam v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 248 App.
Div. 182, 185, 288 N. Y. Supp. 403, 406 (1st Dep't 1936).
107. 232 App. Div. 228, 249 N. Y. Supp. 640 (1st Dep't 1931); Faulkner v. Irving
Trust Co., 231 App. Div. 87, 246 N. Y. Supp. 313 (1st Dep't 1930) semble.
108. An inference that such a transaction will be disfavored may be drawn from
the opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Harris, 267 N. Y. 1, 195 N. E. 529 (1935),
(1935) 44 YALE L. J. 901. (appointment to unborn grandchildren ineffective divest-
ment of interest of minor children who would take on default of appointment).
109. Porter v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 60 F. (2d) 673, 674 (C. C.A. 2d, 1932).
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